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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
oral non-cognitivism1 is the metaethical view that 
denies that moral statements are truth-apt.  Ac-
cording to this position, utterances such as 
“violence is wrong” and “kindness is good” do not 
express beliefs or possess truth-values; instead, they express cer-
tain non-cognitive attitudes similar to desires or intentions.  Non-
cognitivism meets a serious challenge with what is known as the 
Frege-Geach problem.  The essential difficulty is that even if it is 
possible to give a convincing account regarding how simple 
moral utterances like those above express certain non-cognitive 
attitudes, the non-cognitivist owes an explanation as to what 
those same moral sentences mean when they appear as embed-
ded components in more complex sentences.  For example, what 
is taking place when somebody claims that if violence is wrong, 
then it’s wrong to kill spiders?  Furthermore, if moral statements 
have no truth-values, then how is it that they can apparently be 
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included in valid logical arguments? 
In this essay I shall discuss one of the more recent at-
tempts at solving the Frege-Geach problem: that of Allan 
Gibbard.  Gibbard develops a form of non-cognitivism which he 
dubs ‘norm-expressivism.’  I shall explain what norm-
expressivism is, and how it is supposed to deal with the Frege-
Geach problem.  I will then look at the objection that Gibbard 
fails to really explain what is wrong with accepting the premises 
of a valid moral argument while denying the conclusion.  I agree 
with this criticism and conclude that Gibbard’s account, as it 
stands, doesn’t deal satisfactorily with the Frege-Geach problem.  
I will then briefly discuss whether Gibbard has the resources to 
adapt norm-expressivism in such a way that this problem might 
be fixed. 
 
II. MORAL NON-COGNITIVISM 
Non-cognitivism in ethics has taken various forms, from the 
emotivism of A.J. Ayer to Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism.  The 
main claim made in such views is that moral statements do not 
actually express propositions or predicate properties of the 
world, so they are not truth-apt.  Furthermore, when a person 
makes a moral judgment he or she is not primarily expressing a 
belief—or any other type of cognitive psychological state—but is 
rather expressing some sort of non-cognitive attitude, more like 
an emotion or a desire. 
To give an example: according to non-cognitivism, when 
I say “violence is wrong” I am not predicating violence with the 
property of wrongness, and I am not expressing the belief that 
violence is wrong.  Rather, I am expressing some sort of non-
cognitive attitude which I hold towards violence—something 
like disapproval, perhaps.  It is important to note also that I am 
not asserting that I hold this non-cognitive attitude towards vio-
lence.  My utterance expresses the attitude itself; it does not as-
sert the proposition or fact that I have that attitude.  Non-
cognitive attitudes like feelings of approval and disapproval are 
not the sort of things that can be true or false; hence, moral state-
ments lack truth-values. 
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One of the main benefits of non-cognitivism is that it is 
more metaphysically parsimonious and less epistemically prob-
lematic than its realist metaethical rivals.  By denying that moral 
statements are truth-apt, we can avoid the need for a distinct 
realm of moral facts, knowledge of which our ethical investiga-
tion is somehow supposed to strive towards.  Adopting non-
cognitivism in order to obtain such benefits, however, will only 
be worthwhile if it is still possible to make sense of our moral 
practice.  The Frege-Geach problem suggests that the non-
cognitivist might not actually be able to do so. 
 
III. THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM 
The Frege-Geach,2 or embedding, problem is seen by many as 
“the rock on which expressive theories founder.”3  The basic dif-
ficulty is this: even if the non-cognitivist can make a convincing 
case that simple predicative moral utterances, such as “violence 
is wrong,” are expressions of non-cognitive attitudes (let’s say 
that “violence is wrong” expresses a disapproving attitude to-
wards violence), an explanation still remains to be given of the 
meaning and function of moral sentences which appear in em-
bedded contexts.  
To return to the example above, how does “violence is 
wrong” function when it appears as an embedded component of 
this more complex sentence: “if violence is wrong, then it’s 
wrong to kill spiders?”  Someone who makes this utterance does 
not say that violence is wrong, so it simply isn’t plausible to say 
that he or she is expressing the same disapproving attitude to-
wards violence.  Someone could make such a claim while hold-
ing a thoroughly approving attitude towards violence, or not 
holding any non-cognitive attitude towards violence at all. 
Clearly the non-cognitivist has to give a more detailed 
explanation of the semantics of moral sentences.  One obvious 
solution would be to posit an ambiguity of meaning between 
simple moral sentences and those that appear as unasserted com-
ponents of more complex sentences.  However, this option leads 
to further difficulties which make it unacceptable.  Consider the 
following argument: 
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P1      If violence is wrong, then it’s wrong to kill spiders. 
P2      Violence is wrong. 
C1      It’s wrong to kill spiders. 
 
This argument is intuitively valid, but if ‘violence is wrong’ had 
a different meaning in P1 and P2, then somebody reasoning 
thusly would be guilty of equivocation.  C1 only follows from the 
premises if “violence is wrong” has the same meaning in each.  
Geach objects that such arguments cannot contain “a fal-
lacy of equivocation” because they are “in fact clearly valid.”4  
What the argument actually illustrates is the way that “a propo-
sition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and 
yet be recognisably the same proposition.”5  This is what Geach 
terms “the Frege point.”  It offers a “simple and decisive proof” 
that the non-cognitivist cannot postulate an ambiguity of mean-
ing between simple and embedded moral expressions.6 
Furthermore, even if the non-cognitivist could give a uni-
form account of the semantics of moral sentences, there is still 
more to explain regarding the validity of moral modus ponens.  
Conventionally, an argument is said to be valid if and only if the 
truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.  
How, then, can non-cognitivists explain the validity of the above 
argument when, according to their view, at least P2 and C1 are 
certain to lack truth values? 
The Frege-Geach problem threatens to be disastrous for 
the non-cognitivist.  Our ability to engage in moral reasoning 
and debate depends on our ability to make sense of complex 
moral sentences and the inferences we can draw from our moral 
judgments.  The non-cognitivist must provide a plausible ac-
count of the semantics of moral sentences in both simple and em-
bedded contexts that is able to preserve the inferences of intui-
tively valid moral arguments.  In what follows, I will be discuss-





IV. NORM-EXPRESSIVISM AND RATIONALITY 
Gibbard presents his norm-expressivist proposal in Wise Choices, 
Apt Feelings.  Rationality takes center stage in his discussion, 
which is first and foremost an account of what we are doing 
when we judge certain things to be rational or irrational.  The 
way Gibbard sees it, to engage in normative inquiry—“to reason 
about how to live”—is essentially to inquire as to “what kind of 
life it is rational to live.”7 
Gibbard argues that normative judgments—judgments 
about what it is rational to do, think, or feel—do not predicate 
certain thoughts or actions with the property of ‘being rational,’ 
and they do not express beliefs about certain normative facts 
which hold in the world.  To utter a normative judgment is not to 
state a matter of fact, but rather to express a “state of mind.”8  
The judgment that something is rational is non-cognitive, and as 
a result it is not apt for truth or falsity. 
In more detail, Gibbard claims that “to call something ra-
tional is to express one’s acceptance of a system of norms that 
permits it,”9 a norm being “a possible rule or prescription, ex-
pressible by an imperative.”10  For example, my judgment that it 
is rational to add boiling water before milk when making a cup 
of tea expresses my acceptance of norms—rules or prescrip-
tions—that permit, in a tea-making situation, adding boiling wa-
ter before milk.  Again it is important to note that in uttering a 
normative judgment you do not say that you are in a certain state 
of mind, or say that you accept a certain system of norms; you 
simply express your acceptance or state of mind itself.  Actually 
being in that state of mind, then, “constitutes not speaking truly, 
but being sincere.”11  
A system of norms is “the end result of the ways the vari-
ous general normative principles a person accepts combine, 
weigh against each other, and override one another.”12  Gibbard 
characterizes a system of norms, N, as a group of predicates N-
forbidden, N-required and N-optional, where N-x is to be read ‘x 
according to system of norms N.’13  These predicates are descrip-
tive rather than normative—whether or not something is forbid-
den, required or optional according to a given system of norms is 
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a matter of fact.  
Systems of norms “apply to alternatives of some kind;” 
they apply to alternative courses of action, for example.14  A 
given system, N, is complete if, for every possible occasion, every 
available alternative is either N-forbidden, N-required or N-
optional.  N is consistent if no more than one of these predicates 
is applicable to any alternative.15  According to a complete and 
consistent set of norms, then, the alternative which is the act of 
killing spiders will be at least one of required, forbidden or op-
tional (and no more than one of these things).  These basic predi-
cates can be used to construct others; in particular, N-permitted 
means “either N-optional or N-required.”16  
 
V. NORM-EXPRESSIVISM AND MORALITY 
Gibbard’s analysis extends to morality because he thinks that 
moral norms form a subset of the norms of rationality.  Gibbard 
thinks that moral judgments do not express feeling—as the emo-
tivist might claim—but rather judgments of “what moral feelings 
it is rational to have.”17  The peculiarly moral sentiments that 
Gibbard has in mind are feelings of guilt and anger.  Put simply, 
Gibbard claims that “what a person does is morally wrong if and 
only if it is rational for him to feel guilty for having done it and 
for others to be angry at him for having done it.”18  So, for exam-
ple, if I kill a spider, my actions are morally wrong if and only if it 
is rational for me to feel guilty about doing so, and for others to 
feel angry at me for doing so.  
Moral norms “are thus explained in terms of norms for 
guilt and resentment.”19  Since judgments concerning what feel-
ings it is rational to have are non-cognitive according to Gibbard, 
this provides a non-cognitive analysis of moral judgments as 
well.  To judge that it is rational for me to feel guilty about killing 
spiders, for example, is to express a mental state—the mental 
state that is acceptance of a system of norms that permits me to 
feel guilty for killing spiders.  
This, to an “approximation,” is Gibbard’s norm-
expressivistic analysis.  In order to handle the Frege-Geach prob-
lem, however, he thinks that a “substantial transformation” is in 
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order.20  It is this transformation that I shall turn to next. 
 
VI. GIBBARD’S SOLUTION TO THE FREGE-GEACH  
PROBLEM  
In order to tackle the Frege-Geach problem, Gibbard em-
ploys possible worlds semantics to “develop a formal representa-
tion of the ‘normative content’ expressed by normative state-
ments.”21  Gibbard starts by defining “a completely opinionated 
credal-normative state.”22  He does this by asking us to imagine a 
goddess “who is entirely coherent and completely opinionated 
both normatively and factually.”  In other words, there is a com-
plete and consistent way she thinks the world to be, w.  Further-
more she accepts a complete and consistent system of norms, n.  
W and n then constitute the “completely opinionated credal-
normative state,” which Gibbard also terms a “factual-normative 
world <w, n>.” 
A factual-normative world is essentially the familiar no-
tion of a possible world,23 combined with a complete and consis-
tent set of norms.  The factual circumstances surrounding every 
alternative in a given factual-normative world are completely 
determinate.  Because n is complete and consistent, each of these 
alternatives is one of n-required, n-forbidden or n-optional (and 
no more than one of these things).  Given this, and given that 
which alternatives are permitted or forbidden by any system of 
norms is a matter of fact, “any particular normative judgment 
holds or not, as a matter of logic, in the factual-normative world 
<w, n>.”24  In other words, w and n “entail a normative judgment 
for every occasion.”  
In reality, however, nobody is like such a goddess.  
Gibbard therefore goes on to define a way of representing what 
mere mortals like ourselves accept factually and normatively.  
One can use possible worlds semantics to represent the content 
of factual propositions by associating a proposition with the set 
of possible worlds in which it is true.  Gibbard suggests, analo-
gously, that a given normative statement, S, can be represented 
by the set of all factual-normative worlds for which it holds.25 
To see whether S holds in a given factual-normative 
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world, first the normative predicates in the sentence are replaced 
by their n-corresponding descriptive predicates.  ‘Rational,’ for 
example, gets replaced by ‘n-permitted,’ and ‘irrational’ gets re-
placed by ‘n-forbidden.’  If the resulting sentence is true in w—
which will be a matter of fact, since n-predicates are purely de-
scriptive—then the original sentence is said to hold in <w, n>.  
Gibbard denotes the set of factual-normative worlds in which a 
given normative statement, S, holds: OS.26 
Now that we’re able to say what it is for a normative 
statement to hold in a factual-normative world, Gibbard thinks 
that if we simply add the dictum “the content of a normative 
statement is the set of factual-normative worlds for which the 
statement holds” then we have a way of solving the embedding 
problem.27  I’ll return to my example to make this clearer.  The 
statement “if violence is wrong, then it’s wrong to kill spiders,” 
is firstly to be read: 
 
T: “if it is rational to feel angry at someone who commits 
acts of violence, then it is rational to feel angry at someone 
who kills spiders.”28  
 
This is translated into the statement: 
 
Tn: “if it is n-permitted to feel angry at someone who com-
mits acts of violence, then it is n-permitted to feel angry at 
someone who kills spiders.”  
 
T holds in a given factual-normative world <w, n> if and only if 
Tn is true in w.  Since sentences containing n-predicates are de-
scriptive rather than expressive, the grammatical complexity of 
Tn causes no problems for ascertaining whether or not Tn holds in 
a given factual-normative world.  Whether or not it is, say, n-
permitted to feel angry at someone who kills spiders in a given 
world will simply be a matter of fact.  The content of T is then 
represented by the set of all factual-normative worlds in which it 
holds, a set that is denoted OT.  
The content of simple and complex normative utterances 
Norm-Expressivism 57 
alike can therefore be represented using this formalism, even 
when the statements concerned have unasserted moral sentences 
as components.  Gibbard’s norm-expressivistic analysis thus pro-
vides a uniform account of the semantics of moral sentences in 
both simple and embedded contexts. 
This formalism also gives Gibbard a way of defining the 
logical relations that hold among normative statements.  Factual-
normative world semantics functions analogously to possible 
worlds semantics.  For example, the content of P is said to entail 
the content of Q29 “if and only if Q holds in all the factual-
normative worlds in which P holds.”30  This will be the case if the 
set of <w, n> that represents P is a subset of the set of <w, n> that 
represents Q.  To return to my original example of moral modus 
ponens, given its translation: 
 
P1n   It is n-permitted to feel angry at someone who commits 
acts of violence. 
P2n   If it is n-permitted to feel angry at someone who com-
mits acts of violence, then it is n-permitted to feel angry at 
someone who kills spiders. 
 
The conjunction of two normative statements is represented by 
the intersection of the sets that represent their respective con-
tents.  The sets representing the contents of the premises are: 
 
OP1 = {<w, n>|  in w it is n-permitted to feel angry at some-
one who commits acts of violence} 
 
OP2 = {<w, n>|  in w, if it is n-permitted to feel angry at 
someone who commits acts of violence, then it is n-
permitted to feel angry at someone who kills spiders} 
 
Using OP to represent the conjunction (so the intersection) of OP1 
and OP2 we get:  
 
OP = {<w, n>|  in w it is n-permitted to feel angry at some-
one who commits acts of violence and it is n-permitted to 
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feel angry at someone who kills spiders} 
 
So OP represents the content of the premises of this argument. 
The conclusion is translated: 
 
C1n   It is n-permitted to feel angry at someone who kills 
spiders. 
 
Let OC represent the content of the conclusion, where: 
 
OC = {<w, n>|  in w it is n-permitted to feel angry at some-
one who kills spiders} 
 
OC clearly contains OP as a subset.  This means that every factual-
normative world in which the premises hold is a factual-
normative world in which the conclusion holds, and the content 
of the premises therefore entails the content of the conclusion.  
According to Gibbard, herein lies the validity of the original 
moral argument. 
 
VII. DOES GIBBARD’S SOLUTION WORK? 
Some have questioned whether Gibbard’s account really suc-
ceeds in explaining why someone who accepts P1 and P2 would 
be committed to accepting C1.  Blackburn objects that Gibbard 
fails to tell us what we can actually say “to someone who refuses 
to hear the wrong combination as ruled out by logic.”31  The 
norms accepted by mere mortals aren’t complete and aren’t nec-
essarily consistent.  Imagine that I accept a system of norms 
which forbids violence, and which also says that if violence is 
forbidden, then killing spiders is forbidden.  Why is there a prob-
lem if the norms that I accept do not also forbid killing spiders?  
The essential problem, Sinnott-Armstrong agrees, is that 
“it is not enough simply to define validity so that modus ponens 
comes out valid.  Valid arguments have force because there is 
something wrong with asserting the premises and denying the 
conclusion of a valid argument.”32  The question that remains to 
be answered, then, is what is wrong with accepting P1 and P2 
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but denying C1 on the norm-expressivistic analysis. 
According to Gibbard’s formalism, “normative state-
ments rule each other out if their representations have no factual-
normative world in common.”  A normative statement is then 
said to be “inconsistent” with the “various combinations of fac-
tual possibilities with normative principles” that it rules out.33  
So, since every factual-normative world in which P1 and P2 hold 
is a factual-normative world in which C1 holds, accepting these 
premises rules out all factual-normative worlds in which the con-
clusion does not hold.  In other words, accepting the premises of 
this argument is inconsistent with denying the conclusion: some-
body who holds P1 and P2 but denies C1 accepts inconsistent 
normative statements.  The problem now, however, is that “we 
still need to ask: what’s wrong with inconsistency?”34 
For a realist it is easy to explain what’s wrong with ac-
cepting inconsistent moral statements: moral inquiry aims at 
truth, “and if our normative judgments are inconsistent, they 
cannot all be true.”35  What the non-cognitivists need to do is 
come up with an equally good explanation as to what is wrong 
with inconsistent normative or moral judgments according to 
their account.  
 
VIII. GIBBARD’S INITIAL ATTEMPT 
In Wise Choices, Gibbard gives a pragmatic explanation of the 
value of consistency.  Being inconsistent and failing to resolve 
our preferences “lays us open to a special kind of self-
frustration.”36  Since the norms you accept will “involve tenden-
cies to action,” accepting inconsistent norms might mean that 
your actions lead to results that you find “unacceptable.”  Fur-
thermore, the norms you accept are of vital importance in your 
normative reasoning and engagement in beneficial normative 
debate.  If you make inconsistent normative judgments then you 
risk “opting out of normative discussion altogether, or discover-
ing that [you] can no longer get others to take [your] claims seri-
ously.”37 
Inconsistency, then, can be costly in various ways, and 
this provides motivation for trying to avoid accepting inconsis-
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tent normative statements.  However, as Sinnott-Armstrong ar-
gues against Gibbard, inconsistency doesn’t necessarily bring an 
end to beneficial normative debate.38  Furthermore, one can eas-
ily think of many instances in which there seem to be no practical 
benefits at all to be derived from normative consistency.  For ex-
ample, I doubt I will incur any practical costs by being thor-
oughly inconsistent in my thoughts about what would be mor-
ally required of me if I found myself one of the only two survi-
vors of a nuclear holocaust. 
The problem for Gibbard’s initial account is that “the 
pragmatic costs either do not arise or are overridden in many 
cases of inconsistency.  But there is still something wrong with 
the inconsistent normative beliefs in these cases.”39  Gibbard sim-
ply fails to explain what is special about logically valid norma-
tive and moral arguments.  It seems that any sort of attempt to 
explain logical commitment in terms of practical commitment is 
bound to fail.  Logical necessity is just stronger than practical ne-
cessity—it’s the strongest kind of necessity there is.  The Frege-
Geach problem is not yet solved. 
 
IX. GIBBARD’S SECOND ATTEMPT 
In response to criticism along these lines, Gibbard gives a further 
explanation of what’s wrong with normative inconsistency.40  In 
order to make his account plausible, Gibbard wants the problem 
with accepting inconsistent normative statements to be analo-
gous to the problem with accepting inconsistent factual state-
ments.  However, since the norm-expressivist cannot say that the 
problem with accepting an inconsistent set of normative state-
ments is that one of them will be false, Gibbard instead suggests 
that the problem with both factual and normative inconsistency is 
that it rules out “all full possibilities.”41  According to Gibbard’s 
formalism, a set of logically inconsistent factual statements is 
represented by the empty set since they cannot simultaneously 
hold in any factual-normative worlds.42  The same goes for a set 
of inconsistent normative statements.  So far we have an analogy 
between inconsistent statements of both kinds.  
The next step, however, is to explain what exactly is 
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wrong with ruling out all full possibilities.  For purely factual 
statements, ruling out all full possibilities means ruling out all 
possible worlds—or “all full ways the world might be.”43  
Gibbard claims that this is the “general defect” of “jointly incon-
sistent factual statements.”  If you rule out all possible worlds, 
however, then you also rule out the actual world, and this leads 
to the “special defect” of jointly inconsistent factual statements: 
they cannot all be true.  
Can we say something analogous about the problem with 
ruling out all “full possibilities” in the purely normative realm?  
For purely normative statements, ruling out all full possibilities 
means ruling out all complete and consistent sets of norms, 
where such a set of norms can be viewed as an “ideally detailed 
contingency plan, a plan for what to do (or think or feel) in every 
imaginable circumstance.”  The “general defect” of jointly incon-
sistent normative statements, then, is that they rule out all “full 
contingency [plans].”44  The problem now, as Wedgwood points 
out, is that we can still ask: “what is wrong with that?”45 
If Gibbard is to stick to the analogy between factual and 
normative statements, then it seems as though the problem 
would be that if you rule out all full contingency plans, then you 
also rule out the correct full contingency plan—or the complete 
and consistent set of norms that actually holds.  But there isn’t a 
‘correct’ system of norms—if there were, then our moral state-
ments would be truth-apt after all.46  This cannot, therefore, be 
the problem with ruling out all full possibilities in the purely 
normative realm. 
So what is wrong with ruling out all full contingency 
plans?  Gibbard claims that “such an ideal plan is the full practi-
cal import of a complete system of norms.”47  If you accept incon-
sistent normative statements, there is no way of adding to your 
present normative commitments that would eventually result in 
your having “a normative judgment for every occasion.”48  It 
seems again, then, that the problem with accepting inconsistent 
normative statements only rests on pragmatic considerations.  
Furthermore, I am not convinced that the fact that normative in-
consistency rules out all ideal contingency plans is actually 
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something that would provide much motivation for avoiding it.  
Such a plan is an unattainable ideal anyway (except for god-
desses) and one which mere mortals simply do not need—we do 
not need to have a normative judgment for every possible occa-
sion, no matter how far-fetched and unlikely.  
Gibbard still only provides an account of why accepting 
inconsistent normative statements is practically problematic, not 
why it is logically problematic.  He fails to address the problem 
that “logic is one thing, pragmatic incoherence … another,”49 and 
norm-expressivism is therefore unable to preserve all the infer-
ences of logically valid moral arguments. 
 
X. DOES GIBBARD HAVE THE RESOURCES TO SOLVE      
THIS PROBLEM? 
One thing that Gibbard’s formalism does succeed in doing is pro-
viding a way of representing the content of normative statements 
according to which, for example, the content of the statement 
“violence is forbidden” is inconsistent with the content of the 
statement “violence is not forbidden” (because their representa-
tions have no factual-normative world in common).  I agree with 
Blackburn that what Gibbard now needs is “a more basic story 
about the states of mind expressed that makes it plain how they 
can be candidates for opposition and denial, and thence … why 
we can naturally and justifiably invent pieces of content—p and 
¬p respectively—as the focus for those oppositions.”50  
Essentially, the states of mind expressed by normative 
statements are “the only resource that expressivists have to ap-
peal to” in their explanation of logical validity.51  What we need 
is a plausible explanation of why the state of mind expressed by 
“violence is forbidden” is opposed to, or inconsistent with, the 
state of mind expressed by “violence is not forbidden.”  The rea-
son why such an explanation would be useful is that Gibbard 
might then be able to account for the logical relations that hold 
between normative statements by claiming that in both the fac-
tual and the normative realm “two sentences are inconsistent just 
in case the mental states that they express are.”52  
As Gibbard’s account stands, even though the content of 
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“violence is forbidden” is inconsistent with the content of 
“violence is not forbidden,” it just isn’t clear why the states of 
mind involved in judging either of these to hold should also be 
inconsistent.  It isn’t clear why the state of mind that you’re in 
when you accept a system of norms according to which p is in-
consistent with the state of mind that you’re in when you accept 
a system of norms according to which ¬p. 
The difficulty is that some attitudes preserve the inconsis-
tency of their contents, and others do not.  The belief that p is in-
consistent with the belief that ¬p, Zangwill claims, “because of 
the contradiction between their contents.”53  Wishing that p and 
wishing that ¬p, on the other hand, is not inconsistent even 
though the contents of these wishes are.54  Believing is, whereas 
wishing is not, an example of what Schroeder terms an 
“inconsistency-transmitting attitude.”  According to Schroeder’s 
definition, “an attitude A is inconsistency-transmitting just in 
case two instances of A are inconsistent in case their contents are 
inconsistent.”55  
The problem for Gibbard, then, is that there isn’t suffi-
cient reason to suppose that the attitude involved in accepting a 
system of norms is inconsistency-transmitting.  There is hope for 
the norm-expressivist, however.  Schroeder suggests that one 
good non-cognitive candidate for being an inconsistency-
transmitting attitude is intention.56  What Gibbard might be able 
to do, then, is adapt norm-expressivism so that the state of mind 
involved in accepting a system of norms is more like the state of 
mind involved in having an intention, or some other non-
cognitive attitude which plausibly preserves the inconsistency of 
its contents.  It is possible that such an adapted version of norm-
expressivism would be able to solve the Frege-Geach problem. 
 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Gibbard’s attempt at solving the Frege-Geach problem, although 
it succeeds in providing a uniform representation of the content 
of simple and complex normative statements, is unable to cap-
ture what is special about logical validity.  I have argued that 
both of Gibbard’s attempts to explain what’s wrong with accept-
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ing the premises but denying the conclusion of a logically valid 
moral argument fail.  Gibbard’s accounts rely on the pragmatic 
need for consistency, and the demand for logical consistency is 
stronger. 
I have suggested that it may nevertheless be possible to 
adapt norm-expressivism to deal with this problem.  Gibbard’s 
formalism provides a way of representing the relations which 
hold between the contents of normative statements.  What he 
needs now is an explanation of why the states of mind involved 
in making normative judgments with inconsistent contents are 
themselves inconsistent.  If he can do this, then he might be able 
to give a plausible account of logical inconsistency in both the 
factual and the normative realm by arguing that statements are 
logically inconsistent when the mental states that they express 
are logically inconsistent.  In other words, what would be wrong 
with accepting the premises but denying the conclusion of a 
moral argument would be that the states of mind involved in do-
ing these two things are actually inconsistent with each other. 
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